JANGAN PERKECIL PERANAN DR MAHATHIR, ‘HUSAM’ DEMI ‘SELAMATKAN MALAYSIA’...

JANGAN PERKECIL PERANAN DR MAHATHIR, ‘HUSAM’ DEMI ‘SELAMATKAN MALAYSIA’...

Posted: 13 Jul 2016 06:38 PM PDT

"UMNO dan BN perlu berwibawa untuk membawa reformasi pemikiran dan tindakan politik yang jauh meninggalkan perjuangan mereka yang ‘kecewa’...berjuang untuk rakyat dengan membuktikan siapa ‘yang dekat di hati rakyat dan benar-benar mengambil berat soal rakyat’."

Jangan cepat melatah atau membuat spekulasi awal kalaupun benar bekas Perdana Menteri Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad akan menubuhkan parti baru.

Lihat dan dengar dulu apa kata ‘orang tua itu’. Membuat kenyataan secara pra-pengumuman menunjukkan sikap penakut dan perasaan bimbang dengan berita itu.

Bukan Dr Mahathir yang kata beliau mahu tubuh parti baharu.

Kenyataan datang daripada pengikut setia Mahathir, Datuk Seri Khairuddin Abu Hassan yang  mendedahkan bahawa terdapat rancangan untuk menubuhkan sebuah parti baru yang mungkin diterajui oleh bekas perdana menteri itu.

Dengan mengatakan Dr Mahathir perlu menubuhkan sebuah parti baru kerana pembangkang menganggap dirinya sebagai liabiliti, ia tidak membawa apa-apa kesan pun kerana perjuangan Dr Mahathir adalah bagi tujuan ‘Selamatkan Malaysia’.

Apapun, kita juga mahu tahu apa itu selamatkan Malaysia. Selamat daripada apa dan siapa? Bukan sekadar isu rasuh dan penyelewengan, juga bukan sekadar kempen Anti-Najib.

Yang penting apa perjuangan parti itu untuk membanteras jenayah, tembak-menembak,  keamanan negara dan sebagainya. Bagaimana dengan dasar luar kita, ke arah mana?

Semalam Menteri Pelancongan dan Kebudayaan Datuk Seri Nazri Abdul Aziz menyambut baik langkah itu kerana ia cara yang sah untuk menentang kerajaan secara demokrasi> Namun,  anggota Majlis Tertinggi UMNO itu yakin parti baru itu akan mencatatkan prestasi lebih teruk daripada bekas parti serpihan Umno Semangat 46.

Ini berdasarkan kemenangan besar Barisan Nasional (BN) pada pilihan raya kecil berkembar bulan di Sungai Besar dan Kuala Kangsar.

Maknanya, tubuhlah parti apa pun, ia tidak akan mengguris UMNO atau BN sedikit pun.

Namun, beberapa persoalan boleh dilihat dalam penubuhan parti baru ini (jika benar berlaku).

Pertama,  siapa menjadi tulang belakangnya

Ramai mengatakan ia berkisar sekitar 3M - Dr Mahathir, Muhyiddin dan Mukhriz.

Namun, mungkin daripada 3M itu ia menjadi ‘HUSAM’, iaitu Datuk Husam Musa, Datuk Seri Shafie Afdal serta 3M yang akan menjadi tulang belakang parti baharu itu.

Malah, Tun Dr Mahathir mungkin akan membawa mereka yang berpengaruh seperti bekas Menteri Pengangkutan. Tun Dr Ling Liong Sik.

Walaupun Nazri secara berseloroh tetapi memperkecilkan keupayaan pemimpin berkenaan dengan mengatakan:  “Muhyiddin akan jadi timbalan, Mukhriz sebagai ketua pemuda, (bekas Ketua Wanita Umno) Rafidah Aziz sebagai ketua wanita dan Khairuddin jadi budak bancuh teh, ” pengaruh mereka tetap ada.

DR Ling mungkin masih berpengaruh di kalangan masyarakat Cina.

Kedua, kemasukan pemimpin parti tradisi, termasuk PKR

Mungkin juga akan ada pemimpin dari parti UMNO, PAS dan parti-parti lain, tidak terkecuali, PKR akan tertarik dengan gerakan Dr Mahathir ini.

Memang benar parti baru ini akan menjadi ‘rumah baru’ kepada mereka yang ‘marahkan UMNO’ tetapi tidakkah ini akan merugikan BN dalam konteks mendapatkan undi dalam pilihan raya?

Kenapa tidak ada usaha untuk ‘memujuk’ mereka agar undi tidak hilang?

UMNO boleh berbangga dan bermegah mempunyai tiga juta ahli tetapi bagaimana dengan undi untuk BN?

Kalaupun mereka menyertai parti baru ini, yang nyata mereka akan tetap bersama berjuang dalam Pakatan Harapan yang akan menjadi semakin membesar hasil gabungan parti baru yang akan ditubuhkan ini.

Pada ketika pemimpin UMNO mengatakan pembangkang sedang menghadapi masalah, mereka juga perlu ‘lihat cermin’ dalam BN sendiri.

Husam Musa...tidak berminat?

Jangan perkecilkan pengaruh Husam, bukan sahaja di Kelantan tetapi di kalangan ‘golongan muda’.

Di pihak UMNO dan BN, basih banyak isu yang perlu diselesaikan antara parti, termasuk dalam isu ‘pemberontakan ketua cawangan UMNO’ kesan pemecatan Muhyiddin, Mukhriz dan Shafie, selain isu RUU 355, kuasa autonomi Sarawak serta pembahagian kerusi untuk bertanding dalam pilihan raya umum akan datang.

UMNO juga berdepan dengan krisis sendiri seperti berlaku di Terengganu, selain perlu memantapkan kedudukannya di Kedah, Pahang, Perak dan Sabah.

Ketika ini yang dilihat sedikit tenang ialah di Melaka, Negeri Sembilan dan Johor.

Sokongan NGO Kepada ‘Selamatkan Malaysia’

Mungkin mereka tidak menyertai parti baru ini atas apa juga alasan. Namun jika mereka menyokong dan bersimpati dengan gerakan Dr Mahathir dan kumpulan ‘HUSAM’ itu, akan menyebabkan keadaan yang tidak baik untuk UMNO/BN

Perlu diingat bahawa NGO terdiri daripada kumpulan pekerja, belia, pelajar institusi pengajian tinggi, kumpulan anak seni, penulis, penggerak masyarakat, wanita, puteri dan pemuda serta agamawan adalah kumpulan yang merasakan mereka juga perlu layanan baik.

Sejauh ini UMNO dan BN dilihat tidak mendekati golongan ini dan mereka dibiarkan ‘bertaburan’. Sedangkan mereka adalah tenaga penggerak penting masyarakat dan kumpulan ‘pengundi muda’.

Suara mereka bagaikan tidak didengari oleh UMNO dan Barisan Nasional. Bagaimana jika mereka menyokong parti baru ini dalam pilihan raya?

Kumpulan Majoriti Senyap dan Maklumat Internet

UMNO dan BN mengharapkan media arus perdana dan cyber-trooper mereka untuk memenangkan hati rakyat.

Mungkin, mereka berjaya di dua PRK Kuala Kangsar dan Sungai Besar. Mereka berjaya kerana tumpuan 100 peratus dan yang menentang pula PAS dan parti yang baru mahu bertapak, Parti Amanah Negara (AMANAH).

Namun pada pilihan raya umum nanti, masing-masing pihak menjaga kawasan masing-masing dan pandai-pandailah ‘membawa diri’.

Tidak jelas sejauh mana kumpulan ‘majoriti senyap’ di dua kawasan Parlimen itu, namun pada pilihan raya umum akan datang, kumpulan ini dijangka bangkit untuk menyatakan ‘pendirian mereka’

Tidak semestinya semuanya menentang kerajaan tetapi kemungkinan membantah terghadap isu-isu penting negara yang diperkatakan seperti penyelewengan, rasuah, salah laku dalam pentadbiran kerajaan Pusat dan negeri akan menjadi faktor yang menguntungkan pembangkang.

Bagaimana jika mereka – kalaupun tidak mengundi pembangkang tetapi tidak mkeluar mengundi menyokong kerajaan?

Berjuang melalui gagasan Pakatan Harapan

Memang sukar sebuah parti baharu bergerak memandangkan kini sudah ada parti yang asasnya berlandaskan kaum dan agama.

Kita perhatikan kedudukan kini dalam konteks parti politik di Malaysia:

1.      UMNO – berlandaskan bangsa Melayu dan Islam (terbuka untuk Bumiputera di Semenanjung dan Sabah), ditolak untuk berkembang di Sarawak;

2.      PAS – berlandaskan Islam dan Melayu (terbuka untuk sokongan bukan-Islam melalui Dewan Himpunan Penyokong PAS (DHPP));

3.      PKR – parti pelbagai kaum dan tidak merujuk kepada perjuangan agama tertentu;

4.      DAP – mendakwa untuk pelbagai bangsa tetapi majority bukan-Melayu;

5.      MCA – parti untuk orang Cina;

6.      MIC – parti untuk orang India;

7.      PBB – berbagai kaum pribumi Sarawak dan tidak terikat kepada Islam;

8.      AMANAH – serpihan PAS untuk Melayu –Islam.

Namun jalan tetap terbuka untuk parti baharu ini menawarkan alternatif sebagai parti berbagai kaum dengan menekankan kepada Islam progresif.

Bukan Melayu dan bukan Islam tidak akan bimbang kepada pendekatan ini jika parti benar-benar berjuang untuk melindungi ‘orang bukan Islam’ bukan mengeluarkan fatwa yang boleh meragukan rakyat bukan di negara ini.

Yang penting ialah parti ini menghormati dan menjaga kepentingan bukan-Melayu dan bukan-Islam bukan memperjuangkan Islam secara yang radikal atau tidak mengamalkan ‘kesederhanaan Islam yang tulen’.

Walaupun ada pihak mengatakan banyak parti sudah lingkup kerana tidak dapat melawan UMNO umpamanya parti Semangat 46 yang pernah dianggap terkuat pimpinan Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah dan oleh Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim tokoh yang amat kuat masa beliau jadi timbalan perdana menteri menubuhkan tubuhkan PKR, kes kali ini berlainan sekali.

‘Selamatkan Malaysia’ Jadi Gagasan

Kali ini UMNO bukan berdepan dengan isu pembangunan, kronisme, perbezaan kaum dan pendapat atau reformasi tetapi isu penyelewengan, salah laku dan rasuah selain ke mana Malaysia akan di bawa di masa hadapan.

Dengan kata lain, masa depan bagaimana untuk generasi Malaysia akan datang.

Ini menjadi satu persaingan yang sengit dan UMNO serta BN perlu bersedia melawannya.

UMNO dan BN tidak perlu gentar tetapi gerakan ini  tetap menjadi ancaman.

Masa kurang dua tahun ini perlu digunakan oleh UMNO untuk memperkuatkan kedudukannya dan meminimumkan seboleh mungkin segala persepsi buruk rakyat terhadapnya.

‘Perang BN melawan pembangkang’ jangan lagi berasaskan kononnya pemimpin pembangkang menjadikan fitnah, tuduhan atau kritikan palsu sebagai modal.

Fakta hendaklah dibalas dengan fakta dan hujah menentang dan mempengaruhi hujah.

Jangan bandingkan parti baru yang mungkin ditubuhkan oleh Dr Mahathir ini seperti AMANAH.

Semalam Menteri Kemajuan Luar Bandar dan Wilayah, Datuk Seri Ismail Sabri Yaakob dalam sidang media di kementeriannya berkata “...dalam negara kita bebas masing-masing nak tubuh parti, tubuhlah. Sedangkan Mat Sabu pun rasa layak dia tubuh parti dia.”

Jangan perkecilkan kemampuan parti lain kerana kita tidak tahu apa kan belaku dalam tepoh dua tahun ini.

Yang nyata perjuangan parti baru itu mirip perjuangan gerakan Selamatkan Malaysia – bukan sekadar untuk ‘menggulingkan Perdana Menteri Datuk Seri Najib Razak’  tetapi melaksanakan pembaharuan institusi dan perjuangan kea rah masyarakat yang lebih progresif, termasuk dalam konteks Islam.

UMNO dan BN mampu melawan ‘badai’ ini dengan syarat pemimpinnya tidak dihanyutkan oleh sikap selesa dan terlalu yakin.

Jentera partinya, termasuk tentera siber memerlukan pendekatan pengisian baru.

.

Dengan kedudukan entiti baru ini  berjuang untuk rakyat, seperti juga UMNO dan BN, masing-masing perlu membuktikan siapa ‘yang dekat di hati rakyat dan benar-benar mengambil berat soal rakyat’.

Selain itu yang penting, UMNO dan BN perlu berwibawa untuk membawa reformasi pemikiran dan tindakan politik yang jauh meninggalkan perjuangan kalangan mereka yang ‘kecewa’.

Apa pun, semuanya ditentukan dengan pengumuman jam 3 petang ini di Yayasan Kepimpinan Perdana, Putrajaya.

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Special Purpose Con Job?

Special Purpose Con Job?

14 JUL 2016

Information now emerging from the Auditor General’s Report, led DAP Finance Spokesperson Tony Pua to state yesterday that he suspects that much of the money paid in 2014 to the bogus Aabar Limited BVI company was in fact circulated back through 1MDB’s Brazen Sky bank account in Singapore in an attempt to con Parliament and the auditors that cash had been “redeemed” from the so-called Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), which had allegedly invested US$2.3 billion in the Cayman Islands.

“it occurred to me that the 1MDB Financial Statements for the year ending 31 March 2014 were signed off by the auditors, Deloitte coincidentally on 4 November 2014, when 1MDB GIL also made a payment of US$222 million to Aabar (BVI).” says Pua.

“At that point in time, there was increasing concern over 1MDB’s US$2.318 billion investment in an obscure investment fund based in Cayman Islands.  The Board of Directors minutes have shown that the Management were repeatedly instructed to redeem the investment and repatriate the proceeds back to Malaysia throughout 2014. The company was under immense pressure because the authenticity of the investment was being publicly questioned…. 

The accounts were finally signed off by Deloitte when 1MDB was able to “show” the auditors that US$1.22 billion have been redeemed.  The money was however, not repatriated to Malaysia.”

It is a shocking suggestion, because it would mean that two Swiss banks, BSI and UBS, would have been involved in helping shift these suspicious transactions through their Singapore branches – in some cases turning round hundreds of millions of dollars in one day, according to the figures.  This is because BSI managed the Brazen Sky account and UBS managed the bogus Aabar Limited account.

Sarawak Report has now examined the Auditor General’s analysis of this alleged ‘redeeming’ and ‘repatriation’ of the SPV cash (see full excerpt beneath) and the figures in his report lend weight to Pua’s suspicions.

However, the AG complains he cannot reach a solid conclusion on the matter, because of the incomplete and limited information provided to him by the company.

“JAN [Audit Dept] was unable to verify 1MDB GIL’s subsequent payments or how the funds redeemed from the (SPC portfolio) funds were used because important documents such as bank statements and payment vouchers were not handed by 1MDB for JAN’s verification despite five requests being made between May and October 2015. Documents such as bank statements should be readily available to bank clients.” [8.12]

Such criminal obstruction of its own ought to demand severe action against managers, whom the Public Accounts Committee have called for the police to investigate.

What emerges from Chapter 8 on the Cayman SPV and supposed repatriation of the cash is yet again a litany of appalling bad practice at 1MDB, changing stories and missing money. The Auditor General officially confirms what critics have long suspected, which is that 1MDB serially lied to parliament and the public and utterly failed in its duty:

“The issues that were uncovered depict a company which had made unwise business decisions, took high risks and was not in line with 1MDB’s status as a Government-owned strategic development company to help develop the country.”[8.29] the Auditor General angrily concludes.

‘Round-Tripping’?

The figures from Chapter 8, make very interesting reading when compared to the bank transfer documents we publicised earlier in the week, which showed payments from 1MDB Energy and 1MDB Global to the Singapore UBS account of Aabar Limited during the relevant period in 2014.

The AG’s figures show the cash transfers that were allegedly made from the Cayman Island SPV to 1MDB’s Brazen Sky account at BSI Bank in Singapore Sept-December 2014 as the ‘cash’ was allegedly ‘redeemed’ through a number of transactions.

First look at the money that the Auditor General records as having arrived into Brazen Sky from anonymous portfolios linked to the fund during late 2014 (bearing in mind he complains he was not given any of the bank statements of the company to prove its financial status or the origin of the cash):

“Difficulties in obtaining important documents such as the Brazen Sky bank statements and 1MDB GIL statements resulted in JAN not being able to verify the transfer of funds or payment of Aabar’s termination of option and interest payments” [AG Rpt 8.26.g]

 

The money allegedly arriving in Brazen Sky from the SPV in the Caymans, according to figures provided to the Auditors Deloittes and later the Auditor General

Second, look at Sarawak Report’s table of money flows obtained from the bank transfers to the UBS Aabar Limited account from 1MDB Energy And Global, published earlier this week.

Sarawak Report’s summary of the information provided by the 9 transfer documents submitted to the auditor

Finally, combine the two tables to see how virtually identical over-all sums were sent to the fake Aabar by 1MDB Energy and later 1MDB Global to those which arrived back a few days later in the Brazen Sky Singapore account – and were then forwarded straight on/back to 1MDB Global.

One two occasions the same multi-million sums left 1MDB Global to fake Aabar and then arrived back there (via Brazen Sky) on the very same day: US$255,500,000 on October 23rd and then US$222,222,000 on November 4th.  Tony Pua would seem to have a point!

Round-Tripping?

As Pua points out it was on November 4th, after the key figure of US$1.22 billion was flushed through Brazen Sky, that the auditors Deloittes finally agreed to sign off the belated accounts for that year on the basis that this money had been ‘redeemed’ from the Cayman Islands.

Except, the AG points out that instead of being repatriated to Malaysia to pay 1MDB’s pressing debts as had been demanded again and again of management by the Board, this money was sent on to 1MDB Global’s BSI bank account in Lugano instead.

Or should we say it was SENT BACK to 1MDB Global’s BSI bank account in Lugano from where it had come in the first place?

The PetroSaudi black hole

What the evidence surely shows is that there was no money in the Caymans to be sent back in the first place and this was nothing more than a desperate cover-up and an audit con-job that went to extraordinary lengths.

Indeed, once the money had been ‘redeemed’ to Lugano 1MDB management made sure to write it off straight away, claiming the money had been immediately spent on terminating options and paying off loans.

What everyone who has followed 1MDB knows is that the original US$1.83 billion PetroSaudi investment, which was to go through no less than four different ‘investment strategies’ in as many years, to the Auditor General’s major disapproval, was actually stolen right from the start.

Jho Low’s Good Star Limited snaffled US$700 million on Day One, then a further US$330 million later in 2011. US$260 million was siphoned into the buy out of UBG in 2010 and the remainder went to PetroSaudi itself in return for its services in “acting as a front”.  The formerly two-bit company bought itself a drill ship and purchased a lucrative drilling concession in Venezuela on the proceeds of its “joint venture”.

So, when 1MDB claimed in 2012 that it had ‘cashed in’ its share of the PetroSaudi venture  for a fancy profit of US$2.3 billion they were defying the laws of mathematics and common sense. Who would have paid such money for an empty shell?

Hence began the series of twisted and turning shadowy tales about the supposed Special Purpose Vehicles, conveniently hidden in the Caymans with off-shore bank accounts, allegedly ‘investing’ in ‘portfolios’ that it was claimed could be translated back into solid cash.

No one believed Shahrol Halmi at the time and they will believe him even less now that they have seen how the money circulated round 1MDB in late 2014, with the help of the friendly off-shore fake Aabar and compliant Swiss bankers in Singapore.

The Auditor General was outrageously denied the full information he was owed to explain exactly what happened here, but what all the evidence suggests is that 1MDB started pumping money it had borrowed for its Energy and Global subsidiaries through the fake Aabar, so that it could then be sent on to Brazen Sky posing as cashed in profits from the separate Cayman Island portfolios.

No wonder that during this very November 2014 the management had started drafting resolutions to explain why 1MDB Global might need to pay money to Aabar – the remaining US$1.5 billion from their 2013 Tun Razak Exchange loan was about the only significant remaining ready cash available in the group.  Hence the agreement to ‘extend the Aabar guarantee’ to this loan as well, in order to find an excuse to pay for the privilege. Aabar’s parent company IPIC have confirmed they knew nothing of the deal – the money went to the fake Aabar of course.

So, while the AG was not given the statements to prove this is what happened, his remarks could not have delivered a clearer official verdict of utter condemnation that nothing that was done was done correctly or honestly by 1MDB (see below).  No wonder the Public Accounts Committee notified the police.

Remaining US$993 million

There was of course the alleged remainder of the SPV/Cayman money that the Board had called on 1MDB to return no less than 9 times for over a year:

The AG listed the occasions the Board had asked for the PetroSaudi/Cayman Islands money to be returned without success

The remaining money was US$993 and 1MDB had explained to the Board it would need to be used to pay off yet more options to the fake Aabar, for which purpose it was allegedly also paid to the Brazen Sky account.

Except, there turned out to be no money here either as the AG details in painful stages. First 1MDB had claimed they had sold the remaining SPV to fake Aabar again, because it was “as good as cash” although the market apparently was not keen on buying the SPV notes at that particular time.

Then the deal was reversed into an alleged cash sale, which turned out to be merely notes.   The Auditor established that there was no cash in the BSI account, which was plainly why 1MDB had had to borrow real cash from Deutsche Bank to pay its mounting obligations, based on the supposed collateral which turned out to be notes not cash.

When the truth because known in April 2015, Deutsche Bank pulled its loan and 1MDB had to pull its favours with the corrupt Aabar officials, who dragged IPIC into a bail out. The Auditor provides a useful further insight into the terms of that secretive ‘Term Sheet’, which finally expired on June 30th with 1MDB having failed to fulfil its obligations to IPIC, sparking legal action and a demand of US$6.5 billion, now facing the Malaysian taxpayer.

Many had asked what assets 1MDB had promised Aabar in return for its loan, as referred in that binding term sheet.  The answer, found the auditor, was that no one at 1MDB or Aabar actually seemed to know – even a year later. Because 1MDB had yet to demonstrate what were genuine assets and what were fake.

Read the Chapter 8 Translation

Chapter 2, Item 8 – Redeeming of investment portfolio from Segregated Portfolio Company (SPC)

 

8.1       The investment in the SPC was made through the Investment Management Agreement signed on Sept 12, 2012. Between the period of Sept 2012 and Sept 2013, the (initial) investment of RM6.8 billion (USD2.318 billion) saw a returns of RM662 million, which is dividends of RM445.93 million and capital distribution of RM216.07 million as stated in the financial statements for the year ending March 31, 2014.

8.2       In response to criticisms that was raised in Parliament and through the media regarding the investment portfolio in the SPC which was managed by fund managers in the Cayman Islands, the Board had on May 20, 2013 agreed that the investment be redeemed in stages to improve public perception towards the credibility of 1MDB’s investments. In relation to this, the Board had issued 9 instructions between May 2013 and Aug 2014 to the Management to prepare a plan, schedule and (ultimately) redeem the SPC portfolio funds either in stages or as a whole, according to this schedule:

Table 2.3 – Board’s instruction regarding redeeming of SPC investment

Board Meeting NumberDate of MeetingInstruction3/201320/05/2013Prepare plan and schedule of for redeeming of funds in stages5/201319/08/2013Prepare plan and schedule of for redeeming of funds in stages6/201311/11/2013Liquidate investments in stages and return funds to Malaysia1/201427/01/2014Opportune moment to redeem investments in view of high value of USDSpecial27/02/2014Management to take immediate action in redeeming funds and returning it to Malaysia3/201422/04/2014Redeem funds as soon as possible although there are no needs for cash in the near term. Funds could be used in local institutions.4/201410/06/2014Redeem at least 1/3 of the portfolio investments on Sept 30, 2014 or all on March 31, 2015.5/201421/07/2014Redeem 1/3 of the portfolio investment on Sept 30, 2014 and all March 31, 2015. Management is instructed to redeem funds on those dates6/201418/08/2014Redeem everything before or on Dec 31, 2014.

Source: Board of Director’s meeting minutes.

8.3       However, no action was taken by the 1MDB management although there were specific clauses in the Subscription Agreement which allows the client to liquidate the funds at any time with a 30-day notice. The readiness of the management to liquidate the portfolio funds in a month was also confirmed by Hazem (then 1MDB CEO) during the Board Meeting on June 10, 2014.

8.4       Following repeated instructions from the Board, eventually, a portion of the SPC portfolio funds amounting to USD870 million were redeemed in mid-October 2014 while another USD300 million was redeemed a few days later. This was informed to the Board on Oct 20, 2014.

8.5       On Nov 4, 2014, Hazem informed the Board during a meeting that a total of USD1.2 billion from the SPC Portfolio Funds were redeemed. It was used to pay the interest on a loan and Aabar Investment PJS’s termination of option in order to secure 49% equity in Powertek Investment Holdings Sdn Bhd and 1MDB Energy (Langat) Sdn Bhd. During the same meeting, the chair of the Board had informed Messr Deloitte (who was present during the meeting) that the balance of the SPC portfolio investment would be redeemed before the end of November 2014 and gave a guarantee that he would oversee the redeeming of the funds.

8.6       During the meeting on Dec 20, 2014 Azmi (1MDB CFO) had informed the Board that the latest USD1.392 billion was redeemed from the SPC portfolio and the balance of USD939.87 million will be redeemed by the end of December 2014. The Board was also informed that the entire SPEC portfolio funds were used as collateral for the USD975 million loan from Deutsche Bank. The Board opined that it was unfair to use the entire SPC portfolio fund, valued at USD2.318 billion, as collateral when the loan from Deutsche Bank amounts to only USD975 million. Lodin (Board chair) raised the issue of 1MDB management not informing the Board regarding the collateral and that he and Ismee had given a guarantee to the BNM governor that money redeemed from the SPC portfolio investment would be brought back to Malaysia.

8.7       This information contradicts Arul Kanda’s statement to the PAC on Dec 1, 2015, in which he said that USD1.22 billion from the SPC portfolio funds were not used as collateral because it was already redeemed. Only the balance of USD1.11 billion from the SPC portfolio funds along with dividends of USD120 million were used as collateral with Deutsche Bank for the USD975 million loan. However, checks by JAN found that (Arul Kanda’s) statement was inaccurate because between Nov 14 and Nov 24, 2014, an additional USD173.5 million was redeemed, bringing the total amount redeemed from the SPC portfolio investment to USD1.392 million. All funds that were redeemed were transferred into the account of 1MDB GIL and only the balance of USD939.87 million which were not redeemed could be considered as collateral for the loan from Deutsche Bank.

8.8       Further checks by JAN on the Facility Agreement found that the conditions of the loan did not include clauses which support the statements of both Azmi (Dec 20, 2014) and Arul Kan (Dec 1, 2015). The conditions for the loan are as follows:

Table 2.4 – Condition for the USD975 million loan from Deutsche Bank AG, Singapore Regarding the SPC Portfolio Fund Collateral

ClauseCondition20.2 (b)Brazen Sky shall ensure that the Brazen Sky net worth will not at any time be less than USD1,500,000,000.22.2 (b)With effect from the date which is six momths from the utilisation date, the borrower and Brazen Sky shall ensure that, at all times thereafter, the amount standing to the credit of Brazen Sky Account is at least equal to the Brazen Sky Required Balance.

 

Note:

Brazen Sky Account – Bank Account in Hong Kong

Brazen Sky Required Balance – a cash amount of USD600 mil up to a maximum of USD1,170 mil; USD500 mil plus aggregate of each Accordion Increase Amount x 1.2 [?]

Source: Facility Agreement USD975 mil

8.9       The Board, during a meeting on Dec 20, 2014 was also informed that Deutsche Bank AG, Singapore had agreed to allow USD993, from the USD1.392 billion redeemed fromt he SPC funds, to be used for Aabar’s termination of option payments. The balance of USD399 million was used to pay the interest of the USD Note.

8.10     However, details of the USD993 million payment to Aabar for the termination of option and the payment of interest for the USD Note could not be verified by JAN. The board also sought details on the payment on Dec 20, 2014, but JAN’s checks showed that the matter not raised during the subsequent Board meeting. During the Feb 23, 2015 meeting, the Board had raised questions regarding the payment for Aabar’s termination of option which was only told to the Board after payment was made. This demonstrated that the payment for Aabar’s termination of option was made without the approval of the Board.

8.11     During a meeting between 1MDB and JAN on Sept 9, 2015, 1MDB had said that the physical payment to Aabar was made through the account of a 1MDB subsidiary – Brazen Sky Limited (Brazen Sky) through BSI Bank – on behalf of the terminating company because 1MDB did not own an account abroad. However, checks by JAN found that funds redeemed from the SPC portfolio amounting to USD1.392 billion which were transferred to Brazen Sky’s bank account between Sept 11 2014 to Nov 24 2014 were transferred to 1MDB Global INvestment Limited (1MDB GIL) between SEpt 12 2014 and Dec 8 2014 amounting to USD1.417 billion. An analysis on Brazen Sky’s transactions between Sept until December 2014 found that there were no payments for the purpose of the Aabar termination of option. Details of Brazen Sky’s transactions are as follows:

Chart 2.5 – Brazen Sky Limited Transactions for Period Between September and December 2014

TransactionsIn (USD)Out (USD)11/09/2014Portfolio C2110,000,000.02 12/09/20141MDB GIL 94,420,000.0007/10/2014Portfolio C2146,518,719.52 Portfolio C1228,481,280.48 1MDB GIL 375,000,000.0014/10/2014Portfolio B2280,045,600.00 Portfolio C1104,954,400.00 1MDB GIL 340,000,000.0023/10/2014Portfolio A227,099,840.00 Portfolio B1198,247,200.00 Portfolio B230,152,960.00 1MDB GIL 255,500,000.0031/10/2014Portfolio A193,292,800.00 31/10/2014Dividends131,707,200.00* 04/11/20141MDB GIL 222,000,000.0014/11/2014Portfolio A2125,000,000.00 1MDB GIL 125,000,000.0024/11/2014Portfolio A248,500,000.00 26/11/20141MDB 43,168,213.17*08/12/20141MDB GIL 5,500,000.00TOTAL1,392,292,800.021,417,420,000

Source: Brazen Sky Limited Bank Statement, obtained from foreign authorities

Note (*): Not included in total amount

8.12     The transfer of funds redeemed from the SPC portfolio from Brazen Sky to 1MDB GIL was found to be in contravention of the instructions from the 1MDB Board, which has demanded that the funds be brought back to Malaysia. The Board’s approval was also not sought for this transaction. The reason for the transfer to 1MDB GIL by 1MDB’s management could not be ascertained because 1MDB GIL has its own investment assets with fund managers amounting to USD1.56 billion on March 31, 2014. 1MDB GIL had also obtained a USD Note loan amounting to USD3 billion. JAN was unable to verify 1MDB GIL’s subsequent payments or how the funds redeemed from the (SPC portfolio) funds were used because important documents such as bank statements and payment vouchers were not handed by 1MDB for JAN’s verification despite five requests being made between May and October 2015. Documents such as bank statements should be readily available to bank clients.

8.13     After redeeming USD1.392 billion from the SPC portfolio, the Board on Nov 13, 2014 urged (the management to) redeem the balance of USD939.87 million before the end of November 2014. The same instruction was given again on Nov 25, 2014.

8.14     On Jan 12, 2015, the Board voiced their disappointment with the 1MDB management who had previously given the impression that the SPC funds would be brought back (to Malaysia) but as of that day, it had not happened. The situation then became more complicated because 1MDB was facing serious cash-flow problems in its attempt to repay a RM2 billion Maybank loan and payment obligations for equity in the 3B Project [Note: Jimah power plant] at the time.

8.15     During the same meeting, Arul Kanda had informed the Board that the balance of the SPC portfolio funds amounting to USD939.87 million was redeemed and held in the form of cash since Dec 31, 2014. This was in line with what Azmi told the Board on Dec 20, 2014 – that the balance would be redeemed by end-2014.

8.16     However, checks by JAN found several statements which raises doubts on whether the balance of the SPC funds amounting to USD939.87 was in the form of cash or units. An analysis on the statements made between Jan 12, 2015 until Mar 3, 2015 showed that the redeeming of SPC funds in the cash amounting to USD939.87 had taken place. However, checks by JAN found that the sum of USD939.67 did not exist in Brazen Sky’s bank account during the period. The chronology of statements regarding the redeeming of SPC portfolio investment is as follows:

Table 2.6 – Chronology of statements regarding redeeming of the balance of SPC portfolio investment funds amounting to USD939.87 million

 StatementSource12/01/2015Mr Arul updated the Board that the balance of USD939,874,085 had been redeemed and had been held as cash since Dec 31, 2014.Special Board Meeting07/02/2015Mr Arul: “The cash is in our accounts and in US dollars. I can assure you (about that) … I have seen the statements”.The Business Times, Singapore, Feb 7, 2015.23/02/2015Mr Arul informed the Board that, per the terms of the Deutsche Bank loan taken out in Sept 2014, there is a need for the USD975 million loan to be cash-collateralised at USD1.20 for every USD1.00 of the loan, by March 2, 2015. He therefore recommended, and that Board agreed, that the loan be repaid from the remaining USD939 million cash proceeds from the redemption of the investment portfolios held by Brazen Sky Limited, and the balance from the proposed Government of Malaysia loan.Board meeting No 1/201503/03/2015Mr Arul updated the Board that further to the Board decision on Feb 23, 2015 he had instructed the CFO to utilise the proceeds of Brazen Sky Limited redemption to repay in full the USD975 million Deutsche Bank loan on March 2, 2015. However, the CFO informed him today that BSI apparently declined to apply the proceeds in that manner until they received a suitably worded indemnity from Deutsche Bank to release BSI from any liability in relation to application of the funds in that manner.Special Board meeting

Source: 1MDB board minutes and news articles

8.17     Arul Kanda’s statement to the Board on March 3, 2015 raises the question of why BSI had previously shown no objection towards the transfer of the monies from the SPC portfolio investment amounting to USD1.417 billion between Sept 12, 2014 until Dec 8, 2014. This appears to show that 1MDB’s management did not provide the correct or complete information regarding the SPC investment (money) to Arul Kanda. Arul Kanda had frequently attributed the information he was presenting during Board meetings to Azmi (CFO) and Terence (Executive Director, Finance). During PAC’s meeting on Dec 1, 2015, Arul Kanda also acknowledge that his understanding of the redeeming of SPC funds was learned in stages. Azmi and Terence, as the directors of Brazen Sky, should have provide details about the SPC portfolio investment to Arul Kanda.

8.18     During the Board meeting on March 24, 2015, Arul Kanda explained, based on information supplied by Azmi, that Aabar agreed to purchase the balance of the SPC portfolio investment fund amounting to USD939.87 million from Brazen Sky at the same value. Checks by JAN found that the agreement that was referred to was the Asset Sale Agreement signed on Jan 1, 2015 between Brazen Sky and Aabar Investments PJS Limited (Aabar Ltd). The agreement was made by 1MDB management to ensure that the receipt of funds redeemed from the balance of the SPC portfolio can done before March 31, 2015 in accordance to the wishes of the Board. The redeeming of the funds was done through an agreement because Brazen Sky was of the opinion that the SPC fund managers were unable to redeem the SPC funds through normal redeeming processes because of weak market sentiments at the time. However, it was found that the agreement was signed without prior knowledge of the Board and shareholders.

8.19     Checks by JAN also found that the sale of the balance of SPC portfolio investment to Aabar Ltd contradicts Clause 21.4 (a) in the USD975 million Facility Agreement by Deutsche Bank – “No obligor shall enter into a single transaction or a series of transactions to sell, lease, transfer or otherwise dispose of any asset.” This showed that the management had acted against the instructions of the Board which required the redeeming of SPC portfolio investment before the end of Dec 2014 and that the proceeds be brought back to Malaysia. The management’s justification for not carrying out the instruction in January 2014 can be disputed because the value of the USD at the time was high. 1MDB’s management should rightfully not be concerned about losses during the redeeming process because the value of the SPC portfolio investment was guaranteed by Aabar Investment PJS on the principle value.

8.20     Arul Kanda also told the Board on March 24, 2015 that Azmi had explained that the redeeming of the entire SPC portfolio investment had happened in early January 2015. However, a sum of USD939.87 which should be received from Aabar was still in the SPC portfolio fund structure. Since 1MDB’s management took into consideration of Aabar’s credit position and the good relations between the two companies, the agreement in which Aabar takes over the SPC portfolio investment was considered to be “as good as cash”. However, without the cash payment, 1MDB was unable to repay its debt of USD975 million to Deutsche Bank or prepare a cash collateral of USD1.17 billion for the loan.

8.21     Following this, the Board through a resolution dated March 25, 2014 agreed with a proposal by Azmi and Terence for Brazen Sky to terminate the Asset Sale Agreement, dated Jan 2, 2015, with Aabar Ltd and replace it with a Share Sale Agreement. According to the proposal, all equity in Brazen Sky is to be sold to Aabar Ltd at a consideration value of USD1.20 billion and the first payment of USD300 million must be made before April 30, 2015. The purpose of selling Brazen Sky was to fulfill the condition set by Deutsche Bank regarding the cash collateral of USD1.17 billion which must be prepared by Brazen Sky on behalf of the lender – 1MDB Energy Holdings Ltd. The shareholders agreed with the proposal via a resolution on March 25, 2015. However, this document was not presented to JAN because 1MDB’s management said that the deal was not yet finalised. All statements to the board on March 24, 2015 – beginning with the Asset Sale Agreement and proposed Share Sale Agreement – give the impression that information is being changed according to the situation, in which the balance of the SPC portfolio investment which was initially said to have been redeemed in cash, but is now reported to be in the form of units.

8.22     Thus, Aabar Ltd’s commitment to uphold their end can be questioned because Azmi had told the Board on April 23, 2015 that the balance of USD939.87 which should have been received by Aabar Ltd was still in the structure of the SPC portfolio investment because Aabar Ltd had yet to confirm when the payment should be made. Meanwhile, Arul Kanda told the Board on May 11, 2015 that the takeover of Brazen Sky by Aabar Ltd had yet to take place.

8.23     However, on May 25, 2015 the Board was informed that negotiations with Aabar were taking place, in which IPIC/Aabar were to takeover a portion of 1MDB Group’s assets alongside obligations for two USD Notes amounting to USD3.5 billion. The Board was also informed that the agreement and advance payment of USD1 billion will be finalised by the end of May 2015. This is the third time the redeeming of the balance of the SPC portfolio investment and negotiations with Aabar/Aabar Ltd was changing in shape.

8.24     On May 28, 2015 the Board approved through a resolution to have a Term Sheet for Settlement Arrangements (Binding Term Sheet) between 1MDB Group, Ministry of Finance Inc (MKD), International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC) and Aabar Investments PJS Groups (Aabar). The Binding Term Sheet was signed by all four parties on May 28, 2015. Among the important terms in the Binding Term Sheet was that IPIC will pay 1MDB USD1 billion before or on June 4 2015 and takeover the obligation to pay interest and principle for the two USD Note – each amounting to USD1.75 billion. According to Arul Kanda’s explanation to the Board on June 14, 2015, the Binding Term Sheet did not state in detail which assets would be transferred to IPIC/Aabar because it is still under negotiation. Among the assets which have been identified amounts to USD4.892 billion, consisting of a deposit amounting to USD1.4 billion for the IPIC guarantee on the USD Note, 1MDB GIL investment fund amounting to USD1.56 billion, the SPC portfolio investment amounting to USD939.87 million and payment for the Aabar termination of option amounting to USD993 million. Three important issues have been set for the following dates:

A definitive agreement must be implemented by July 31, 2015Transfer of assets at the minimum value of USD1 billion to IPIC/Aabar by Dec 31, 2015Transfer of the balance of asset that have been identified by June 30, 2016

 8.25     On June 5, 2015, 1MDB had received the advance of USD1 billion from IPIC under the Binding Term Sheet through its subsidiary Brazen Sky. Based on the shareholders resolution on May 28, 2015 and resolution by the Board dated June 2, 2015, the sum was to be used for the payment of USD50 million in fees to Yurus Private Equity I and the balance was for the Deutsche Bank loan amounting to USD975 million.

8.26     Issues regarding the redeeming of SPC Portfolio INvestment for the period between 2013 and 2015 are as follows:

Payments for the Aabar termination of option were not put before the Board for prior approvalProceeds of funds redeemed from the SPC portfolio amounting to USD1.392 billion was not brought back to Malaysia as instructed by the 1MDB BoardProceeds redeemed from SPC portfolio amounting to USD1.417 billion were shifted to 1MDB GIL but the Board was told that it was used for the Aabar termination of option payment amounting to USD993 millionDifficulties in obtaining important documents such as the Brazen Sky bank statements and 1MDB GIL resulted in JAN not being able to verify the transfer of funds, payment of Aabar’s termination of option and interest paymentsThe Asset Sale Agreement signed on Jan 2, 2015 between Brazen Sky and Aabar Ltd for the sale of the balance of SPC portfolio investment amounting to USD939.87 milllion to Aabar Ltd was signed without the knowledge of the Board or shareholders.The value of the first redeeming process (USD1.392 billion) and the balance which will be taken over (USD939.87 million) amounts to USD2.33 billion, which is almost the same as the initial investment amount of USD2.318 billion on Sept 12, 2012. This shows that the SPC portfolio investment did not make significant gains.The change in statements on the balance of the SPC portfolio investment – first it was said that it was redeemed and kept in cash on Dec 31, 2014, subsequently it was stated that it was taken over by Aabar Ltd on Jan 2, 2015, but still regarded as “good as cash” although no money was received.

8.27     In summary, 1MDB’s initial investment through PetroSaudi in 2009 which involved a large sum did not bring foreign investment into Malaysia, which was not in line with the objective of establishing the company. […] 1MDB’s early investments through funds from the issuance of IMTN bonds amounting to RM5 billion saw a change in investment instruments four times. Beginning with the USD1 billion equity investment in 2009 through the JV with a subsidiary of PetroSaudi International Limited, followed by the investment in Murabahah Note (USD830 million/RM2.59 billion) in 2011 and 2012, until it was changed to into the SPC portfolio investment amounting to USD2.318 billion in Cayman Islands on Sept 2012. A portion of the SPC portfolio investments was redeemed in 2014 and used to finance various commitments and its investments. This investment resulted in a balance of USD939.87 million in the form of SPC portfolio investment units on March 31, 2015.

8.28     The decision to switch from one investment instrument to another within a short period of time while involving large sums showed that the investment decisions were not made in accordance with a proper management structure and does not appear to have a long term strategic investment plan.

8.29     Issues that were uncovered depicts a company which had made unwise business decisions, took high risks and was not in line with 1MDB’s status as a Government-owned strategic development company to help develop the country. It should be managed in accordance to best practices in order to safeguard the company and Government’s interest.

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MAJOR EXCLUSIVE - UBS Singapore Held The Fake Aabar's Account And Received IMDB Global's Cash From BSI!

MAJOR EXCLUSIVE - UBS Singapore Held The Fake Aabar's Account And Received IMDB Global's Cash From BSI!

11 JUL 2016

In what appears to be a major step forward in the unravelling of the mystery of 1MDB’s missing billions, Sarawak Report has obtained records of telegraphic transfer documents, which were handed by 1MDB executives to the Auditor General’s enquiry in February.

These indicate that hundreds of millions were channelled from 1MDB, via two Swiss banks BSI and UBS in Singapore, to the fake BVI subsidiary of IPIC/Aabar, called Aabar Investments PJS Limited in the course of 2014.

And they reveal that Aabar Limited’s main bank account in Singapore was held by none other than Switzerland’s top player, UBS.

One of 9 transfer documents submitted to the Auditor’s enquiry by 1MDB. The ordering customer was 1MDB Global’s account holder BSI Bank Lugano (see the SWIFT number for BSI Lugano). The beneficiary was the bogus Aabar Limited, using its UBS account in Singapore

The discovery places Switzerland’s largest bank UBS squarely in the spotlight for the first time in the context of this global scandal – the documents show that a total of just under US$2 billion* passed into a UBS Singapore account belonging to Aabar Limited during the course of 2014.

1MDB Global paid Aabar through BSI Bank account

The transfer slips, which the Auditor recorded were produced by 1MDB management at a meeting in February, also show that a major chunk of the fund’s US$3 billion bond issue raised by  Goldman Sachs in 2013 – supposedly to create the aborted Tun Razak Exchange – was in fact also funnelled through BSI Bank in Lugano to the fake Aabar during 2014, using the UBS account.

1MDB had claimed this money was being ‘invested’ by its subsidiary 1MDB Global, however it has already been queried why so much government cash was passed to the small, private BSI Bank after the bond issue by Goldman Sachs?

We can now see that no less than US$1,238,687,500 was apparently passed from 1MDB Global’s BSI Lugano account to the fake Aabar/IPIC subsidiary’s account at UBS in 6 payments in late 2014.*

According to these remittances, UBS used its United States Stamford Branch to conduct the US clearing requirements for the majority of these transfers.

Sarawak Report’s summary of the information provided by the 9 transfer documents submitted to the auditor

Payments by 1MDB Energy Holdings

A further three transfers during the same period (May-September 2014) went from a separate 1MDB subsidiary 1MDB Energy Holdings to the same fake Aabar.

The two later payments (above) also went to the UBS Singapore account, whereas the first had been paid  by an off-shore subsidiary of 1MDB Energy Holdings in Labuan (which held an account with none other than the Aabar owned Swiss Falcon Bank in Hong Kong) to a separate fake Aabar Limited account, which was also held by BSI Lugano.

The same transfer slips (examples at base of story) indicate that the bogus Aabar Limited also held a bank account with Standard Chartered Bank in the United Arab Emirates.

The transfers from 1MDB Energy Holdings total a further US$856,317,607 paid into the fake Aabar’s accounts, resulting in a grand total of US$2,133,965,107 received by the fake Aabar through these transfers.

In his report the Auditor has referred to the payments by 1MDB Energy Holdings, which were justified in terms of terminating IPIC’s options and security deposits.  The money had been raised from a loan by Deutsche Bank based on supposed collateral held by BSI Bank in Singapore (later found not to exist).  We now know that money went to the fake Aabar, mostly through UBS.

Rejected by the Auditor!

Yet this evidence and related documents, even though it was presented by 1MDB officials, was ultimately excluded by the Auditor from his report, on the basis that it was belated information and contradicted other explanations provided earlier by 1MDB management for their payments to Aabar Limited (1MDB had been criticised claiming they had settled the same options twice over).

The role of UBS in hosting the fake Aabar account was therefore not included in the Auditor’s main report.

Questions for Switzerland’s top bank

The relatively small private Lugano bank, BSI, has already been shut down in Singapore and is facing a fine in Switzerland and on-going criminal proceedings, owing to its apparent gross negligence in the handling of suspicious 1MDB related accounts.

This devastating new evidence produced by 1MDB itself to Malaysia’s own audit investigation will inevitably extend the same enquiries to Switzerland’s largest bank.

It leaves UBS is exposed for managing the main account for the fake Aabar Limited at its branch in Singapore and for having willingly accepted a series of staggering payments, each worth hundreds of millions of dollars from 1MDB, while failing to apparently notice that the off-shore company was not in fact officially registered under the IPIC/Aabar group of companies.

Given the sums involved, it would seem to constitute a shocking failure of compliance and due diligence by one of the world’s major banks, which recently also lost a legal bid to prevent Swiss prosecutors from examining its accounts held for the Sabah Chief Minister, Musa Aman (earlier exposed by Sarawak Report).

Indeed, it appears that a large chunk of 1MDB’s missing billions were channelled into this single UBS Singapore account, thanks to the banks apparent oversight.

Forged by 1MDB?

There is one caveat to this information, which is that the Auditor General has described certain material, including these bank transfer documents, as incomplete and even “suspicious” in a paper issued by his enquiry, in which he explained why he had excluded the series of 1MDB papers supplied by management in February from his final audit:

“Remittance Slip regarding payments to Aabar and Aabar Ltd

There are 9 remittance slips regarding payments to Aabar (1) and to Aabar Limited (8) which were presented to JAN on Feb 2016. This important information was not acknowledged or raised during meetings with 1MDB’s management on Dec 16, 2015. The veracity of the form (format?) of documents was suspicious as it does not include written instructions to the bank nor bank statements as supporting documents.” [Auditor’s paper on additional documents presented by 1MDB to the enquiry in February]

From the AG’s document discussing his rejection of the material from 1MDB

If 1MDB had indeed provided false and misleading information to the Auditor and if these papers and bank transfer documents are indeed fake or forged, then this public exposure represents an opportunity for UBS to set the record straight and deny the bank was involved with the bogus Aabar Limited as 1MDB managers have now alleged.

Either way the implications are shocking, but if what 1MDB claims is true then a huge portion of the missing billions have now finally been publicly traced to this UBS account number 827758 in Singapore held for the bogus Aabar Investments PJS Limited (see base of article).

What the Malaysian public and indeed the global regulators will want to know is what happened to the money next?

The criminal enquiries currently under way have doubtless already asked this very question of a number of Switzerland’s top banking executives.

*correction on earlier figures

 

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Damning Summary By The Auditor General On 1MDB's PetroSaudi Ventures

Damning Summary By The Auditor General On 1MDB's PetroSaudi Ventures

9 JUL 2016

The Auditor General’s report into 1MDB is written in professional and dispassionate language.  However, no one could fail to miss the stark criticism and disapproval contained within those paragraphs of factual analysis.

Preceding over 330 pages of tight scrutiny of the evidence made available to him (which he points out was not nearly as much as he would have wished or expected) the AG provides the usual ‘Executive Summary’ for such reports, focusing on the key information and points to be made.

From this Executive Summary we today translate his analysisof the fate of the original US$1.83 billion investment into the PetroSaudi Joint Venture and the next follow up investment into the 1MDB subsidiary SRC International, using money primarily borrowed from the public pension fund KWAP.

His task was made considerably more difficult he says, owing to the fact that 1MDB failed to provide much of the normal documentation an auditor would expect to perform their task:

“JAN [Auditor’s Department] faced limitations while performing this audit in view of the fact that some original or important documents were either submitted late or were not provided by 1MDB for the purpose of verifying transactions or as evidence for the audit.….

The limitations resulted in a significant impact on the audit process in terms of verification of the actual financial position, operations and related transactions. Among important documents that were not submitted were the 1MDB Group’s Management Account for the year ending March 31, 2015 and bank statements from foreign lenders. [The audit team] was unable to access computers, notebooks and servers at 1MDB in order retrieve data and information for cross reference and analysis…”

Executive Summary

The AG sets off by laying out his task, required both by the Cabinet and the Public Accounts Committee, to examine the performance of 1MDB.

He notes the company was originally set up as a sovereign wealth fund, based on Terengganu’s oil reserves, but that the management under CEO Shahrol Halmi fell out with the shareholders in the Terengganu state government almost immediately, because Halmi went ahead with issuing a RM5 billion Islamic Medium Term loan (ITMN) through AmBank, without gaining the appropriate consent of Terengganu.

On July 31st, therefore, the fund was re-launched as 1MDB entirely under the purview of the Ministry of Finance.  The AG notes [2.1.3.] that the Sultan and MB of Terangganu had complained of “malpractice” and “non-compliance” and had accused AmBank of “unauthorised issuance” of the bonds during its dispute with Halmi.

The AG also informs [2.1.4.] that the bond appeared to have been raised from its anonymous lenders at a very punishing rate – those lenders only paid RM87.92 for every RM100 in nominal value “to ensure the issuance of the IMTN was fully subscribed”, he said. He adds that “the coupon rate is 5.75% per annum with effective rate of returns to be 6.68% annually”.  To raise this RM5 billion will cost a total of RM11,90 billion to pay back at these punishing rates the Auditor has noted:

The IMTN issued in 2009 will mature in 2039 with coupon payments amounting to RM287.50 per annum. 1MDB Group’s commitment for the IMTN from November 2015 until 2039 amounts to RM11.90 billion – RM5 billion principle and RM6.90 billion in interest.[6.6 – Executive Summary]

These expensive terms for the loan are known to have been a source of controversy at the time and 1MDB has throughout its existence followed a pattern of such apparently unnecessarily expensive borrowing, which has added considerably to its financial problems and has never been properly explained by the Finance Minister.

PetroSaudi Venture

After outlining such an unpromising start Auditor General, Ambrin Buang, proceeds to outline the first venture in 1MDB’s stated “goal of pioneering investment opportunities abroad”, which was the joint venture with PetroSaudi, signed 28th September 2009.

The AG sums up his disapproval in the following terms:

“The decision to invest in this JV company was made in a period of eight days, without a detailed evaluation process and before issues/conditions raised by the 1MDB Board of Directors were resolved. There were four different companies registered with the name PetroSaudi but the investment proposal paper tabled to the 1MDB Board of Directors did not state this fact.” [2.2.1.]

The Auditor continues with a withering dismissal of the “valuation” of the company provided by a pal of PetroSaudi Director Patrick Mahony, namely the CitiGroup Executive Ed Morse, who was paid US$100,000 for a few hours work:

“The assets valuation report prepared by Edward L Morse was presented on Sept 29, 2009, which is the same date that he was confirmed in his appointment to perform the job by the 1MDB CEO, and the report was received one day after the JV was signed…. The valuation was conducted on assets owned by PetroSaudi International Ltd although the JV agreement clearly states that the company which owned all rights and interests on the agreed assets for the JV project was PetroSaudi International Cayman.” [2.2.2.]

Wow! They valued the wrong company – how come?

The AG goes straight on to complain that this agreement “includes clauses that insufficiently provide for the interest of the company [1MDB]”.  Among these disadvantageous provisions he names the US$700 million “loan”, which was tagged onto the subsidiary that PetroSaudi injected into the joint venture just a couple of days before the deal was signed, on the understanding that the joint venture would then pay it back!

“The payment of USD700 million to the other company was performed without the approval of the 1MDB Board of Directors” confirms the AG [2.2.3.]

Murabahah Notes

Just six months after all this song and dance the whole investment arrangement was altered, writes the AG (you can visualise his eyebrows raising).

1MDB jacked in the whole investment in return for US1.2 billion worth of “notes”, guaranteed by PetroSaudi itself.  This was followed by further ‘Murababaha’ (Islam-friendly) borrowing of US$500 million and then US$330 million – a total of US$1.83 billion [2.2.4.].

All change again!

This arrangement lasted barely two years the AG continues, before 1MDB altered its investment again. This time it converted its borrowing back into shares directly in PetroSaudi, buying a 49% stake in its subsidiary PetroSaudi Oil Services Ltd (PSOSL):

“The swapping of Murabahah Notes for equity in PSOSL was performed without detailed study to determine (PSOSL’s) liability, ability to generate funds and its past financial performance”, notes the AG with a dry sigh [2.2.5.],

This was despite the fact that knowledge of PSOSL’s operations in Venezuelan waters was subjected to restrictions/sanctions by the US and that the company’s drilling contracts were expiring.  Naturally, the plainly unwise investment was done in advance of any kind of Board approval:

“Moreover, the approval by the Board of Directors and 1MDB shareholders to swap the Murabahah Notes for equity in PSOSL was signed on June 20, 2012, but the 1MDB CEO had signed five documents regarding the deal on June 1, 2012. This shows that the 1MDB CEO took action even before seeking the board’s approval” [2.2.6.]

Ooops! change again!

It took only 45 days for 1MDB to change its mind about this investment, continues the AG.  He details how the fund cashed out its PSOSL shares Sept 12 2012 in a deal with the little known fund managers Bridge Partners.

Bridge Partners were supposed to pay a handsome price of US$2.3 billion for these shares, according to the ‘sale purchase agreement’, which was advertised by 1MDB as a successful profit on its original US$1.83 billion investment into this series of PetroSaudi related enterprises.

But, in the end the expectation of much needed cash (1MDB’s other investments were causing major cash flow issues by this stage) was replaced by ‘notes’.  An “Investment Management Agreement” made on the same day with Bridge Partners allowed for its ‘payment’ to 1MDB to be converted into an investment into its own Segregated Portfolio Company (SPC) in the Cayman Islands.  This, says the AG, “was funded through promissory notes in lieu of cash”.

Given that the advertised material relating to this Cayman Island Fund warns investors that they could easily lose all of their investment, these “promissory notes” would appear to be a very poor bargain for the hard currency profit boasted of in 1MDB press releases and Ministry of Finance statements.  The AG adds with a note of utter exasperation:

“This Investment was made through Bridge Global Absolute Return Fund SPC (Bridge Global SPC), which was a month-old company, without a fund managing license and without experience in managing large sum of funds” [2.2.8.].

The words criminally irresponsible come to mind, although they would not be uttered by any auditor in such a context, and indeed the chaps in charge of the fund’s ultimate controllers Avestra, were soon facing criminal charges over the management of this fund in Australia.

Credibility Crisis

By this stage of his synopsis the Auditor General records that 1MDB’s own Board had concluded that they had a massive PR problem on their hands, owing to such a lamentable investment history at the fund.  The Board wanted the cash brought back to Malaysia says the AG, but the management (as usual) refused to play ball:

“[2.2.8.] The Board of Directors on May 20, 2013 agreed that the investment be redeemed in stages in order to improve public perception on the credibility of 1MDB’s investments. The Board of Directors hadissued nine instructionsbetween May 2013 and August 2014 to the management to prepare a plan, schedule and redemption of portfolio funds from the SPC either through stages or as a whole. However, no immediate action was taken by the 1MDB management.

Eventually, on 20th December 2014, Buang confirms the Board were told at a meeting that   USD1.392 billion had been redeemed from this Cayman SPC.  The remainder, they were informed (US$993 million) would be used to ‘terminate options with Aabar’.  But, again, says the AG, the management did not do what they had agreed to with the money:

“In reality, all of those remaining funds from the SPC portfolio were used as collateral for Beutsche Bank for a loan amounting to USD975 million, for which an approval from the Board of Directors was not obtained. Apart from this, the USD1.392 billion which had been transferred to the account of Brazen Sky Ltd was forwarded to 1MDB Global Investment Limited (1MDB GIL). This act contravened the instructions of the Board of Directors who demanded that the SPC portfolio funds be brought back to Malaysia.” [2.2.9]

It really is as breath-taking stuff as you are likely to read from a crusty Auditor’s Report into a government owned company.  Najib for one had plainly expected a bland whitewash, along the lines of 1MDB’s own purchased audits.

As we all know by now, the AG has also pointed out inrelated papers that no proof was ever produced by the rogue management of the company that any hard cash in reality ever returned from the Caymans.  There were simply no bank accounts or documents produced by 1MDB to substantiate its various claims.

To the contrary, it is already known that most of the money (US$1.03 billion) “invested” in PetroSaudi disappeared on Day 1 into Jho Low’s outfit, Good Star Limited. and a further US$260 million went into the buy out of UBG, so how could US$2.3 billion have been realised.  And don’t forget the interest payments!

SRC International

The Auditor General had the same experience of negligent behaviour when he examined the controversial SRC International, he said, a company that was rapidly pulled out of 1MDB and place under the Ministry of Finance, away from the scope of this enquiry:

For example:

“The SRCI board approved USD45.50 million for investment in the coal industry in Mongolia without providing a feasibility study on the matter ..” [3.3]

In conclusion, writes the exasperated AG [2.2.12] “for the period of four years since 1MDB was established…  this investment instrument was changed four times.”  He sums up the present situation:

“6.3 An analysis of the cash flow on the financial statements from year 2010 to 2014 have shown that 1MDB’s paid-up capital was only RM1 million. This small amount showed that the company was not (financially) stable because it required to borrow for its activities. Throughout financial year 2010 until 2014, 1MDB obtained 17 loans (not inclusive of inherited loans) at a nominal value of RM42.88 billion but received cash amounting to RM39.17 billion.However, (the company’s) activities which were funded by loans did not generate the necessary cash flow to repay the loans……

“1MDB needs to prepare large sums to fulfil its obligations – RM4.88 billion in 2016, RM14.74 in 2023 and RM5.14 billion in 2039. 1MDB also requires to have at least RM1.52 billion annually from Nov 2015 to May 2024 to repay its loans.”

For this outrageous situation the AG blames the management, whose controls were “less than satisfactory” and which operated “without due process”.  “Several important investment decisions involving large sums were made .. without any discussion and proper detailed valuation. Several investments were decided on short notice and were high risk.” he says.  Moreover:

“In several situations, the 1MDB management had presented incomplete or inaccurate information to the Board of Directors before an important decision was to be made. In fact, the management sometimes took action without approval from the Board”

In short the Auditor General’s report confirms, after a professional and objective examination, all the criticisms that have been made of 1MDB’s financial mayhem and worse.

The decision to make it an official secret can therefore only be described as a disgraceful cover-up to protect the criminal negligence and misappropriations of the parties concerned.

See excerpts from theEXECUTIVE SUMMARY

http://sarawakreport.us2.list-manage.com/track/click?u=57b26bbe9d2acafa19363b0d2&id=5836ac1215&e=d806eda40a

Bank Of Malaysia's Damning Letter To The Parliamentary Accounts Committee

Bank Of Malaysia's Damning Letter To The Parliamentary Accounts Committee

7 JUL 2016

Signed by the Deputy of the Bank Negara

Appended to the Auditor General’s report and pivotal to his findings is a damning letter from the Bank Negara (BNM) sent to the PAC, which explains in detail the disgraceful circumstances surrounding the removal of US$1.83 billion from 1MDB under the guise of a joint venture with the firm PetroSaudi between 2009 and 2011.

Written by the Deputy Governor of the Bank BNM on 23rd March, the letter outlines why the bank had issued its demand to 1MDB to return the entire amount. We attach the English translation below.

It has to be read in the light of a second letter from the Bank sent on 6th April, which has already been reported, confirming that the sole beneficial owner of Good Star Limited was indeed Jho Taek Low, who was acting as Prime Minister Najib Razak’s official advisor to 1MDB.  A huge chunk of the ‘public investment’ was therefore siphoned into Low’s private company, as has long been argued by Sarawak Report.

False and inadequate information was provided to BNM

Of key note in this crucial letter from the bank are the points that 1MDB failed in its duty to provide full and accurate information to the Bank to explain the purpose for its removal of these public funds abroad.

The letter says that there were three separate applications to export cash “(Sept 29, 2009 (first permission), Sept 6, 2010 (second permission) and May 20, 2011 (third permission)” and it alleges that 1MDB essentially lied to the bank or withheld information in order to get that permission to send the money abroad: “BNM can conclude that 1MDB had received permissions … amounting to USD1.83 billion, without providing complete material information, or through misrepresentation of relevant information, for the purpose of [influencing] BNM’s evaluation of 1MDB’s application.”

This is a damning indictment of 1MDB’s deceitful and criminal tactics, which is dealt with in full by the letter below.  However, it also raises questions about the controls within the Bank itself and why it accepted half-baked and unsubstantiated excuses of this nature?

Were the supposedly independent guardians of the nation’s wealth themselves overly influenced and swayed by the political clout of the man managing the fund – ie Najib himself?

YB Dato,

Information Regarding Cancellation of Permission to 1MDB Under Exchange Controls Act 1953

We refer to your letter dated March 18, 2016 regarding the above mentioned matter.

Applications for permission under the Exchange Controls Act 1953 (AKPW) (which has been abolished and replaced with the Financial Services Act 2013 [APK]) requires the applicant to present the application to BNM alongside information, supporting documents, detailed explanations regarding the transaction and purpose of transaction. All considerations on applications under AKPW or APK requires BNM to always demand for information and comprehensive information from the applicant.For applications for foreign investments, the applicant is not only required to complete the relevant documentations (Form 6b, 9A and 9C) online, but the applicant is also required to provide relevant documents and information regarding the proposed investment. Normally, BNM will contact and deal directly with the applicant to obtain the details and purpose of the investment either before or after the application is made. This ensures that BNM has a complete understanding of the proposed investment before a permission can be granted. It also allows BNM to exercise its mandate to protect Malaysia’s balance of payment and value of our currency.On your question, raised in the letter dated March 18, 2016, […] based on information received from 1MDB following the issuance of instructions under APK and information voluntarily supplied by foreign institutions and authorities, BNM can conclude that 1MDB had received permissions on Sept 29, 2009 (first permission), Sept 6, 2010 (second permission) and May 20, 2011 (third permission) for the purpose of investments abroad, amounting to USD1.83 billion, without providing complete material information, or through misrepresentation of relevant information, for the purpose of [influencing] BNM’s evaluation of 1MDB’s application.Details of the 3 permissions to 1MDB and information received by BNM can be summarised as follows:The First Permission was granted to 1MDB to invest, using foreign currency, to acquire a 40% stake in 1MDB PetroSaudi Limited, British Virgin Island (JV Co), amounting to USD1 billion, for the purpose of investments in the energy, agriculture, real estate and tourism sector. BNM had given this permission based on information provided by 1MDB that the funds will be used by the JV Co for the purpose of investments in those sectors and that the investment will bring Malaysia economic benefits.

1MDB had declared to BNM that the USD1 billion was used to acquire a 40% stake in JV Co which would be remitted by 1MDB to the JV Co’s account, maintained with Banca dela Svizzrera Italiana SA, Geneva and that the USD1 billion was a portion of a working capital of USD2.5 billion which will be invested by the JV Co in the abovementioned sectors. On Sept 30, 2009, 1MDB informed BNM in writing that the funds will be remitted to the JV Co’s account maintained in another bank – JP Morgan (Suisse) SA and RBS Coutts Bank Ltd. BNM acknowledged the change in a letter on the same day. However, BNM was informed by Duetsche Bank Malaysia Bhd on the change in recipient of funds to PetroSaudi, BNM stressed that the change must not go against the original purpose of the investments which have been given permission.

BNM realised that USD700 million from the USD1 billion funds that was given permission was remitted by 1MDB to an account owned by Good Star Limited (GSL) at RBS Coutts Bank Ltd and not the account belonging to the JV Co in Switzerland or PetroSaudi’s account. The transfer of funds to GSL was made by 1MDB on behalf of the JV Co to repay the JV Co’s debt of USD700 million which was advanced to the JV Co by 1MDB’s JV partner which is PetroSaudi Holdings (Cayman) Ltd. This material information was not communicated by 1MDB to BNM during the application for the First Permission although 1MDB had prior knowledge and was informed of the JV Co’s debt and had an intention of using a large portion of the funds to repay the debt before the application for the permission was made through BNM.

Apart from the change of recipient of the remittance (from the JV Co) to GSL, 1MDB has hitherto failed to provide any documentary evidence or source documents to demonstrate that the JV Co has invested in the energy, agriculture, real estate and tourism sector, which was the purpose of the First Permission by BNM. During the material time, BNM was persuaded by 1MDB to believe that the funds will be used for the purpose of investments in the energy, agriculture, real estate and tourism sector through the JV Co and will benefit the JV Co.

Based on information voluntarily provided by foreign authorities, the ultimate beneficial owner of GSL is an individual who has no relations to PetroSaudi International Ltd, which is the shareholder of PetroSaudi Holdings (Cayman) Ltd. On May 28, 2015 the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) and BNM had written to the Attorney-General’s Chambers to seek Mutual Legal Assistance from Switzerland for the purpose of obtaining evidence.

The Second Permission was for 1MDB to provide loans in foreign currency to the JV Co through the subscription of Murabaha Note that was issued by the JV Co amounting to USD500 million (equivalent of RM1.6 billion). The bank had given this permission based on information provided by 1MDB in which the funds amounting to USD500 million will be used by the JV Co to finance a portion of the cost of acquiring a 4% equity stake in a public listed company in France (French Company) which is involved in the generation and distribution of energy. In their application, 1MDB informed BNM that the investment was in line with the strategic mandate given by the Government of Malaysia to 1MDB for the development of the nation’s energy sector.

However, 1MDB has since confirmed that the USD500 million was not used by the JV Co to finance a portion of the cost of acquiring a 4% equity stake in the French Company, as stated by 1MDB to BNM during the application for the Second Permission. In a letter dated May 29, 2015, 1MDB had told BNM that the JV Co had an absolute right to use all funds received from 1MDB. This is a material information that was not revealed by 1MDB to BNM during its application for the Second Permission.

The Third Permission was for 1MDB to provide an additional loan in foreign currency to the JV Co through the subscription of Murabaha Notes that were issued by the JV Co amounting to USD330 million. BNM had provided permission based on information supplied by 1MDB to the Bank, that the USD330 million will be used by the JV Co to finance its oil and gas projects.

However, the funds amounting to USD330 million was transferred to GSL and not the JV Co as previously stated by 1MDB to BNM. 1MDB did not inform the bank of this material information although 1MDB had prior knowledge that the funds will be channeled to GSL and not the JV Co, which is before the application was made to BNM. 1MDB has hitherto not provided any documents and source documents to demonstrate that the JV Co has invested in the oil and gas sectors with the funds agreed by BNM.

The above explanation is our feedback regarding the questions raised by you. We are always ready to provide further explanations regarding the above matters if needed.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Nor Shamsiah Yunus
Deputy Governor

Did BNM succumb to overwhelming pressure?

Zeti – Did the Governor of the independent Bank Negara have insufficient powers to hold 1MDB accountable?

This frank and detailed account raises questions about the robustness of BNM’s own internal checks, when faced with what was clearly an overwhelming political pressure from the Minister of Finance himself.

Clearly, on a number of accounts the bank proceeded owning to deliberate misinformation by 1MDB, including the understanding there would be an injection of a further US$1.5 billion from PetroSaudi into the joint venture as well.

Neither was the “material information” that US$700 million had been tagged as a loan by PetroSaudi onto the subsidiary which it then injected into the joint venture (with a provision for an immediate repayment) communicated to the bank or to the Board of 1MDB.  Again, at the time the second permission was granted, BNM was informed that 1MDB was investing in a French power generation company, which was false.

However, there is no indication that papers were supplied to support the bogus claim by 1MDB nor that once this problem was discovered the matter was actively pursued by the bank until the scandal broke in the media and investigations were launched last year.

Likewise, with regard to the loan for US$330 million, which went straight to Jho Low’s Good Star Limited, supposedly to purchase oil and gas projects, which again never materialised.

Bank Negara documents do show that efforts were made by its regulators to pursue 1MDB for updates on these projects.  However, their communications were arrogantly ignored or sidelined for many months by the powerfully protected management, who under the secret  Section 117 of the company considered themselves to be working solely and directly to the Minister of Finance, Najib Razak.

The letter below:

http://sarawakreport.us2.list-manage.com/track/click?u=57b26bbe9d2acafa19363b0d2&id=562260b284&e=d806eda40a

APA YANG TERSANGAT ISTIMEWANYA LAPORAN SULIT 'AUDIT NEGARA'?

APA YANG TERSANGAT ISTIMEWANYA LAPORAN SULIT 'AUDIT NEGARA'?

Posted: 07 Jul 2016 05:27 PM PDT

Laporan Ketua Audit Negara mengenai 1Malaysia Development Berhad  (1MDB)  adalah dokumen yang  diklasifikasikan sebagai sulit di bawah Akta Rahsia Rasmi (OSA).

Dikatakan dalam laporan itu, ia menyenaraikan pelbagai kebimbangan yang dicatatkan oleh Tan Sri Ambrin Buang terutamanya berkaitan dengan beberapa pemindahan dana yang dipersoalkan, selain butiran pemindahan dana berkenaan.

Kerana disebut sulit, banyak pihak mahu mengetahuinya. Namun jangan cari penyakit kerana ‘yang sulit tetap sulit’.

Bagaimanapun, Sarawak Report mendakwa ia telah mendapat akses meluas kepada laporan Ketua Audit Negara mengenai 1MDB, bersama-sama dengan dokumen utama yang disertakan hasil siasatan itu.

Bagaimana ia mendapat akses sedemikian? Siapa yang mendedahkannya?

Atau apakah Sarawak Report sengaja mahu ‘memanaskan kembali’ isu ini apabila semakin hampir kepada kes pertikaian antara International Petroleum Company (IPIC)  dan 1MDB di London 11 Julai ini yang dilihat ‘tidak akan mendatang kesan besar kepada 1MDB’?

Sesetengah pihak membuat tanggapan salah yang 1MDB  dan pemegang saham perlu membuat pembayaran obligasi AS$6.5 bilion 11 Julai ini.

IPIC dilaporkan akan  memfailkan permintaan timbang tara dengan Mahkamah Timbang Tara Antarabangsa London (LCIA) 11 Julai ini namun 1MDB sudah memberikan jaminan, tiada apa yang besar akan berlaku. Ini kes biasa sahaja.

Kerajaan setakat ini enggan memaklumkan bila laporan itu akan didedahkan atau dinyah-rahsia. Setakat ini, hanya ahli-ahli PAC yang mempunyai akses kepada laporan itu.

Berikutan itu, ahli parlimen pembangkang mempersoal ketiadaan dokumen laporan Ketua Audit Negara berkaitan 1MDB itu,  walaupun laporan berhubung Kawalan Pengurusan Tadbir Urus 1MDB dibentangkan 7 April lalu.

Ahli Parlimen pembangkang pada sidang media di Parlimen.

Ahli parlimen Sungai Petani Datuk Johari Abdul berkata, seharusnya dokumen berkaitan 1MDB disertakan memandangkan siasatan ke atasnya sudah berakhir dan tidak perlu dikelaskan sebagai Akta Rahsia Rasmi (OSA) lagi.

Beliau kecewa  kerana satu lagi dokumen yang dinanti-nantikan iaitu laporan daripada Ketua Audit Negara berhubung 1MDB tidak disekalikan dalam laporan PAC.

Beliau menggesa Ketua Audit Negara memberikan satu tempoh masa bagi dokumen 1MDB tidak lagi dikelaskan di bawah OSA supaya semua ahli parlimen mendapat maklumat mengenainya.

“Saban tahun kita mendapat semua laporan daripada Ketua Audit bukan sahaja syarikat GLC atau jabatan-jabatan tanpa ada klasifikasi tapi dalam isu ini agak memeranjatkan kerana ia dilabelkan di bawah OSA.

“Kita mendesak Ketua Audit Negara memberikan tempoh masa sama ada seminggu, dua minggu atau tiga minggu untuk dokumen ini didedahkan kerana ia hak ahli parlimen untuk mengetahui sebelum sesi parlimen berakhir,” kata beliau pada sidang media di lobi Parlimen pada hari berkenaan.

Ahli Parlimen Shah Alam, Khalid Samad tidak menolak kemungkinan ketiadaan laporan 1MDB adalah bagi menyelamatkan individu tertentu.

“Mungkin ketua audit negara ingin mengelakkan beberapa isu yang bersabit dengan individu tertentu tapi tindakan sebegini menambahkan lagi andaian negatif dan rasa tidak yakin rakyat dan mereka menganggap semeangnya berlaku penyelewengan. 

“Niat ketua audit untuk membantu menutup perkara teetrntu tak membantu. Rakyat terus akan rasa ada penyelewengan dan rasuah dan sebagainya,” katanya.

Rafizi Ramli, Ahli Parlimen Pandan yang juga Naib Presiden dan Setiausaha Agung PKR menerbitkan bahagian tertentu  mengenai Laporan Ketua Audit Negara ini yang menyebabkan beliau didakwa kerana memiliki tanpa kebenaran satu halaman muka surat 98 mengenai Laporan Pengauditan 1MDB yang merupakan kesalahan di bawah Akta Rahsia Rasmi 1972.

Rafizi didakwa.

Dia didakwa melakukan kesalahan itu di lobi bangunan Parlimen, Jalan Parlimen, di sini pada 3 petang, 24 Mac lepas, mengikut Seksyen 8(1)(c)(iii) Akta Rahsia Rasmi 1972 dan boleh dihukum penjara sehingga tujuh tahun, jika sabit kesalahan.

Bagi pertuduhan kedua, Mohd Rafizi didakwa mendedahkan kandungan laporan tersebut dalam sidang media di tempat dan pada masa sama, 28 Mac lepas, mengikut Seksyen 8(1)(c)(iv) akta sama yang membawa hukuman penjara sehingga tujuh tahun, jika sabit kesalahan.

Ahli Parlimen Gua Musang, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzahdalam kenyataannya pada 23 Mac 2016 lalu,  turut mohon agar Parlimen menarik balik klasifikasi rahsia terhadap Laporan Ketua Audit Negara mengenai 1MDB.

Selain membenarkan Ahli-Ahli Parlimen mendapatinya, ia dengan sendirinya akan menghapuskan rasa cemas di kalangan orang ramai yang memikirkan mereka tertipu  dan tidak berhak untuk mengetahui keadaan sebenar di sebalik satu-satunya skandal kewangan negara yang terbesar.

Menurut Malaysiakini semalam , Sarawak Report akan menyenaraikan pelbagai kebimbangan yang dicatatkan oleh Ketua Audit Negara Tan Sri Ambrin Buang dalam laporannya, terutamanya berkaitan dengan beberapa pemindahan dana yang dipersoalkan.

Sarawak Report juga menyediakan butiran pemindahan dana berkenaan.

Malaysiakini tidak mengesahkan sama ada laporan itu adalah sahih mahupun melaporkan kandungan tersebut kerana sekatan undang-undang.

Menurut portal itu, Sarawak Report akan menerbitkan maklumat lanjut daripada laporan Ketua Audit Negara pada hari-hari akan datang.

Laman web pendedah maklumat yang berpangkalan di London itu telah menerbitkan beberapa kandungan apa yang didakwa sebagai perkara sulit di bawah OSA.

Speaker Dewan Rakyat Tan Sri Pandikar Amin Mulia pada April lalu, menolak untuk membenarkan laporan Audit Negara mengenai 1MDB dibentangkan di Parlimen dengan alasan ia masih belum dinyah-rahsiakan.

"Saya tidak boleh membenarkan dokumen yang diklasifikasikan dibentangkan di Dewan Rakyat. Saya akan melanggar Akta Rahsia Rasmi 1972 jika membenarkannya," katanya.

Dengan menjadikannya sulit, laporan Ketua Audit Negara itu menjadi suatu bahan yang ditunggu-tunggu untuk diumumkan secara terbuka dan menimbulkan pelbagai spekulasi.

Apalagi laporan media asing yang memperkatakan banyak isu mengenai pemindahan dana, menimbulkan semakin banyak persoalan.

Apakah dengan terus mengklasifikasikannya sebagai dokumen sulit boleh mengelakkan beberapa isu yang bersabit dengan individu tertentu didedahkan demi melenyapkan tanggapan dan persepsi buruk bahawa pihak berkuasa sebenarnya sedang berusaha menyelamatkan individu tertentu?

Menyelamatkan individu mana daripada apa?

Kenyataan dan hakikat hari ini ialah laporan sulit itu sedang ‘menyulitkan keadaan’ apabila andaian negatif terus berlegar dan rasa tidak yakin rakyat kepada kerajaan tidak dapat dihapuskan.

Seperti kata Tengku Razaleigh, selagi diklasifikasikan sebagai sulit, Laporan Ketua Audit Negara itu menyebabkan rasa cemas dan rasa tertipu di kalangan orang ramai.

Juga, dengan mentakrifkannya sebagai sulit, rakyat dinafikan untuk mengetahui keadaan sebenar di sebalik satu-satunya skandal kewangan negara yang terbesar!

Kerana itu bagi sebahagian pemimpin dan rakyat, mereka akan tetap dan terus percaya wujudnya penyelewengan dalam 1MDB  yang memerlukan pembemterasan penyelewengan itu secara telus dan terbuka.

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